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This study investigates whether a change in credit ratings lead to a change in daily 
excess stock returns. The sample includes daily stock price data for US firms listed 
on the Standard & Poor’s 500 from January 2006 to December 2015. Firms’ excess 
stock returns are compared with the market in a 14-day window around credit rating 
downgrades and upgrades. Our results are asymmetric, that is, there is a significant 
reaction to credit ratings downgrades but not to upgrades. In addition, we report weak 
evidence of upgrades in credit ratings since the 2008 global credit crisis leading to 
significant changes in security prices.
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4 For the purpose of this study, the term entity refers to the issuer of bonds and other securities.
5 Examples of financial obligations are loan repayments (principal), interest, preferred dividends, and 
insurance claims.
I. INTRODUCTION
Credit ratings measure an entity’s creditworthiness.4 Credit ratings provide 
forward-looking estimations regarding credit risk and thus provide opinions 
on the relative ability of an entity to meet financial obligations.5 Credit rating 
agencies such as Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch provide credit 
rating information that allows investors to evaluate the financial health and credit 
worthiness of a firm. Credit rating agencies claim that their opinions are based on 
inside information that is unavailable to stock analysts (He, Wang, and Wei, 2011). 
Investors are influenced by credit ratings when deciding the securities in which 
they want to invest (Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov, 2009).
However, credit ratings are only opinions and not recommendations to buy, 
sell, or hold a security (Gonzalez, et al., 2004; Erlenmaier, 2011; Nordberg, 2011. 
High ratings are not a guarantee that an entity is a safe investment. Even an entity 
with an AAA rating (the highest) has approximately one chance in 600 of default 
over a five-year period. The differences in credit quality increase with each category 
lower down the scale, which is reflected in the default frequencies measured of the 
individual categories (Matthies, 2013). For example, over an 18-year period, from 
1971 to 1988, there were no one-year defaults in the AAA or AA category (Zhou, 
2001). Table 1 summarizes the credit rating scales used by the three largest credit 
rating agencies, that is, S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch.
The table shows a summary of the rating scales used by the three big rating agencies, namely, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch.
Description
S&P 
Scale
Moody’s 
Scale
Fitch 
Scale
Approx. probability 
of default over 5 
years*
Investment Grade
Ca
pa
cit
y 
to
 m
ak
e t
im
el
y 
pa
ym
en
t
Extremely Strong AAA Aaa AAA 1 in 600
Very Strong AA+ Aa1 AA+ 1 in 300
AA Aa2 AA
AA– Aa3 AA–
Strong A+ A1 A+ 1 in 150
A A2 A
A– A3 A–
Adequate BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 1 in 30
BBB Baa2 BBB
BBB– Baa3 BBB–
Table 1.
Summary of the Rating Scales
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The literature reports that changes in credit ratings have different effects on 
stock returns (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and Brooks, 2015). Early studies, using 
monthly stock and bond returns, find no evidence that bond and stock prices 
respond to changes in bond ratings (Weinstein, 1977; Pinches and Singleton, 1978). 
In contrast, recent studies document the price relevance of credit ratings. They 
use common (daily) stock prices to examine responses to bond rating changes 
(Poornima et al., 2015; Kenjegaliev et al., 2016). Their results show that bond 
downgrades by rating agencies are associated with negative abnormal stock 
returns, but there is little evidence of abnormal stock performance being associated 
with upgrade announcements. While changes in credit ratings have both bond 
and stock price effects, capital market responses mainly tend to be asymmetric 
with respect to credit rating changes (Choy et al., 2006; May, 2010; Freitas and 
Minardi, 2013; Fatnassi et al., 2014; Poornima et al., 2015; Mokoaleli-Mokoteli and 
Mongalo, 2017). Other studies mainly confirm that announcements of upgrades 
over different categories have no significant impact on security prices (Choy et al., 
2006; Halek and Eckles, 2010; Freitas and Minardi, 2013).
Mokoaleli-Mokoteli and Mongalo (2017) measure the abnormal returns of 
firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange that underwent a rating change 
between 2000 and 2015. The authors report no significant impact of credit rating 
upgrades announced by the rating agencies on equity prices; however, the market 
reacted significantly negatively to the announcements of firms’ credit rating 
downgrades. The negative reaction to downgrades suggests that only credit rating 
downgrades contain relevant pricing information.
Table 1.
Summary of the Rating Scales (Continued)
Description
S&P 
Scale
Moody’s 
Scale
Fitch 
Scale
Approx. probability 
of default over 5 
years*
Speculative Grade
Vu
ln
er
ab
ili
ty
 to
 n
on
-p
ay
m
en
t
Less Vulnerable BB+ Ba1 BB+ 1 in 10
BB Ba2 BB
BB– Ba3 BB–
More Vulnerable B+ B1 B+ 1 in 5
B B2 B
B– B3 B–
Currently Vulnerable CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ 1 in 2
CCC Caa2 CCC
CCC– Caa3 CCC–
Currently Highly Vulnerable CC CC
Default D Ca DDD
C DD
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The differences in market reactions to rating upgrades and downgrades can 
be explained by the discretionary disclosure hypothesis, that is, where managers 
have discretion over the disclosure of information and prefer to announce good 
news straight away while allowing bad news to be released more slowly (Chen 
et al., 2001; Bae et al., 2006; Alsakka and Gwilym, 2012). Therefore, good news is 
linked with greater disclosure and reduced information asymmetry. On the other 
hand, bad news is associated with reduced disclosure and greater information 
asymmetry (He et al., 2011).
A major anomaly is reported by Kenjegaliev et al. (2016) analysing the impact 
of credit rating changes using German stock data. They show that the German 
stock market adjusts stock prices long before the rating change announcements are 
made. Moreover, they report that the market reacts more strongly to downgrades 
than to upgrades.
Some researchers argue that firms associated with higher credit ratings are 
viewed as a lower-risk investment and vice versa. On the other hand, empirical 
research provides evidence that s strong positive correlation between higher 
credit ratings and firm returns. In other words, low rated firms have lower returns 
regardless of the level of the risk that investors hold (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and 
Brooks, 2015; Narayan et al., 2017).
Researchers investigating the effect of change in the US firm credit ratings 
(Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Brune and Liu, 
2010; Halek and Eckles, 2010; May, 2010; Galil and Soffer, 2011; He et al., 2011), 
European (Gärtner, Griesbach, and Jung, 2011; Urguiza, Navarro, and Trombetta, 
2012; Bernoth, Von Hagen, and Schuknecht, 2012; Fatnassi, Ftiti, and Hasnaoui, 
2014; Kenjegaliev, Duygun, and Mamedshakhova, 2016), and Australasian (Choy, 
Gray and Ragunathan,2006; Creighton, Gower, and Richards, 2007; Li, Jeon, and 
Chiang, 2008; El-Shagi, 2010; Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and Brooks, 2015; Poornima, 
Umesh, and Reddy, 2015) markets report mixed results, which suggests that the 
debate is not over and further investigation is required. Furthermore, there are 
only scant studies on whether current and potential investors have taken greater 
note of changes in credit ratings during or after the financial crisis period of 2008. 
Since the US was highly affected by the global financial crisis (GFC), we examine 
how credit rating change announcements impact S&P500 firms’ stock prices from 
January 2006 to December 2015. We are interested in determining whether there 
is information content in credit ratings for current and potential investors in the 
securities market and whether they lead to significant changes in stock prices after 
announcements of changes (up or down) to firm credit ratings. We undertake 
further analysis to determine whether the market reacts more strongly to one of 
the three credit rating agencies S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch. Furthermore, this study 
analyses whether the impact of ratings changes over or within different classes of 
ratings, that is, investment versus speculative.
To minimize the impact of other information released at the same time as 
credit rating announcements, this study uses daily stock returns to evaluate the 
responsiveness of returns to such announcements. We also control for the impact 
of outliers, which can lead to spurious results.
The main finding of this study is that credit ratings, on average, are negatively 
correlated with future default rates. For example, a firm with the highest credit 
rating of AAA is less likely to default in the future compared to one with a credit 
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rating of B. Furthermore, we report mixed results over the different periods tested. 
Tests for the whole sample produced asymmetric results, similar to prior studies 
(e.g. Choy et al., 2006; May, 2010; Freitas and Minardi, 2013; Fatnassi et al., 2014; 
Poornima et al., 2015). A credit rating downgrade leads to a significant market 
reaction, whereas an upward change in credit ratings has no significant impact on 
the prices of securities.
II. DATA
Our sample includes firms listed on the S&P 500 index from January 2006 to 
December 2015. Data for security prices are from DataStream. Daily share prices 
are used and prices are adjusted for stock splits and dividends. Any firm with less 
than 10 years of data is omitted. Our final sample includes 449 firms (see Table 2, 
Panel A). The Thomson One database was used to extract information on the credit 
ratings of firms. The credit ratings for each company over the 10-year period were 
closely examined to determine if any upward or downward adjustments were 
made and 1,427 cases were noted. Included in this sample are 68 changes in the 
credit ratings of companies where a change from one rating agency was followed 
by a change in credit rating from another agency within five days. This study 
ignores these second changes in credit ratings. A period of five days was selected 
as the event window, which will range in this study from three days prior to the 
event (i.e. the credit rating change) to 10 days after the change. This is to ensure 
that only a single change in credit rating is analysed for a firm. Studies that use 
longer time periods also exclude the impact of second rating change observations 
(He et al., 2011; Choy et al., 2016). After all the exclusions and deletions, we obtain 
a final sample of 1,359 observations, or rating change events, that is, 702 upward 
changes and 675 downward changes.
To analyse how the GFC impacted stock prices, the sample is divided into 
three subperiods: January 2006 to December 2007 (pre-GFC), January 2008 to 
December 2008 (GFC), and January 2009 to December 2015 (post-GFC). Table 2 
reports the results for the subperiods as follows: from January 2006 to December 
2007, there were 172 credit rating upgrades and 128 downgrades; during the credit 
crisis year 2008, there were only 60 credit rating upgrades and 120 downgrades; 
and from January 2009 to December 2015, there were 470 credit rating upgrades 
and 409 downgrades (see Panel A).
The sample is further partitioned into credit rating agency–specific observations 
to test the impact of rating change announcements by the different rating agencies, 
namely, Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P. Table 2, Panel B, shows that the rating changes 
by S&P over the observed period outweigh those by Fitch and Moody’s. Based on 
the final sample of 1,359 rating observations, 804 (59.2%) were announced by S&P, 
compared to 386 (28.4%) by Fitch and 169 (12.4%) by Moody’s.
Additional analysis was undertaken to evaluate the effect of changes in credit 
ratings within and between different rating classes. These movements of changes 
are categorized as movements within investment-grade credit ratings, movements 
within speculative-grade credit ratings, movements up from speculative- to 
investment-grade credit ratings, and movements down from investment- to 
speculative-grade credit ratings. Table 2, Panel C, show most credit rating changes 
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(961 of 1,359, or 70.7%) occur in the investment-grade range. The low numbers 
of observations where credit ratings changed up from speculative to investment 
grade (85, or 6.3%) or down from investment to speculative grade (49, or 3.6%) are 
a big disappointment.
Table 2.
Description of the Sample
The table shows a description of the sample. Panel A provides a summary of the overall changes in the credit ratings observed 
during the sample period and in subsample periods. Panel B provides a summary relating to the changes in the credit ratings 
announced by each rating agency. Panel C provides a summary relating to the changes in the ratings announced for different class 
securities.
Panel A – Overall Changes in Credit Ratings Observed
Sample Upgrades Downgrades Total
Total Rating Changes 1,427
Total Final Sample: Jan 2006 – Dec 2015 702 657 1,359
Sample: Jan 2006 – Dec 2007 172 128 300
Sample: Jan 2008 – Dec 2008 60 120 180
Sample: Jan 2009 – Sep 2015 470 409 879
Panel B – Changes in Credit Ratings by Rating Agency
Observations of Rating Changes by S&P Upgrades Downgrades Total
Total Final Sample: Jan 2006 – Dec 2015 441 363 804
Sample: Jan 2006 – Dec 2007 95 72 167
Sample: Jan 2008 – Dec 2008 44 68 112
Sample: Jan 2009 – Sep 2015 302 223 525
Observations of Rating Changes by Fitch Upgrades Downgrades Total
Total Final Sample: Jan 2006 – Dec 2015 199 187 386
Sample: Jan 2006 – Dec 2007 62 38 100
Sample: Jan 2008 – Dec 2008 13 35 48
Sample: Jan 2009 – Sep 2015 124 114 238
Observations of Rating Changes by Moody’s Upgrades Downgrades Total
Total Final Sample: Jan 2006 – Dec 2015 62 107 169
Sample: Jan 2006 – Dec 2007 15 18 33
Sample: Jan 2008 – Dec 2008 3 17 20
Sample: Jan 2009 – Sep 2015 44 72 116
Panel C – Changes in Credit Ratings by Class of Rating
Observations of Rating Changes within and Between Rating Classes
Upgrades Downgrades Total
Total Sample 702 657 1,359
Changes within Investment Grade Class 449 512 961
Changes up from Speculative to Investment Grade 85 85
Changes down from Investment to Speculative Grade 49 49
Changes within Speculative Grade Class 168 96 264
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Table 2.
Description of the Sample (Continued)
III. METHOD
The majority of the literature has used event study methods and daily return data 
to measure reactions to rating change announcements (Hand et al., 1992; Choy et 
al., 2006; Li et al., 2008; Galil and Soffer, 2011). These studies consider the rating 
announcement day as day 0 and measure returns for various windows (from day 
-120 to +90; Galil and Soffer, 2011) and from six months to three years after the 
event (Dichev and Piotroski, 2001). One of the shortcomings of these studies is 
their inability to evaluate the reactions to these events in isolation from all pertinent 
information that the market has access to during the date of the announcement. 
For example, some rating announcements are accompanied by one or more 
concurrent disclosures that could have influenced the results. Therefore, other 
research has claimed that the ideal window for event studies of this nature is 11 
days long, from days T - 5 to T + 5 or days T - 3 to T + 10 (Corwin and Lipson, 
2000; Kryzanowski and Nemiroff, 2001; Choy et al., 2006; Brune and Liu, 2010). 
Moreover, checks should be made to ensure that no contaminated data are used; 
that is, any news/stories not released by the rating agency itself but related to the 
observation in question on the days surrounding the rating announcement should 
be ignored (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Choy et al., 2006). To overcome the 
limitation stated above, this study uses a relatively short window of 11 days to 
analyse the data.
Observations of Changes between 2006-2007 Upgrades Downgrades Total
Total Sample 172 128 300
Changes within Investment Grade Class 120 91 211
Changes up from Speculative to Investment Grade 14 14
Changes down from Investment to Speculative Grade 14 14
Changes within Speculative Grade Class 38 23 61
Observations of Rating Changes in 2008 Upgrades Downgrades Total
Total Sample 60 120 180
Changes within Investment Grade Class 32 81 113
Changes up from Speculative to Investment Grade 8 8
Changes down from Investment to Speculative Grade 11 11
Changes within Speculative Grade Class 20 28 48
Observations of Changes between 2009-2015 Upgrades Downgrades Total
Total Sample 470 409 879
Changes within Investment Grade Class 297 340 637
Changes up from Speculative to Investment Grade 63 63
Changes down from Investment to Speculative Grade 24 24
Changes within Speculative Grade Class 110 45 155
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Another issue faced by prior researchers is the impact of outliers on the 
results. For example, Kim, Kim, and Ergun (2015) remove the top two outliers on 
opposite sides of the distribution and conclude that the distortions outliers cause 
can be large. Galai, Kedar-Levy, and Schreiber (2008) note that a relatively small 
number of daily return outliers, namely, 2.03% of the sample, severely affects the 
empirical estimation. To control for the effect of outliers, any observations of a 
credit rating change announcement accompanied by other news or events related 
to the company are excluded. This ensures that any abnormal returns recorded on 
bonds and/or stocks can only be related to the announcement of a rating change 
for that company. Furthermore, we undertake robustness checks by removing first 
1% and then 2% of the observations, in line with the method of Ng and McAleer 
(2004), Galai et al. (2008), and Kim et al. (2015).
Event study method is common to evaluate the type of research question 
we have, and we use this method. Daily data are used to measure expected 
and abnormal returns. We use daily log returns because these are convenient 
for multiperiod returns (Campbel, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1996), a better median is 
derived when forecasting future cumulative returns (Hughson, Stutzer, and Yung, 
2006), and the use of the logarithms of returns avoids negative security prices in 
security return models (Jorion, 2001). As stated above, a suitable event window 
to test how credit rating changes impact security prices is 11 days (Corwin and 
Lipson, 2000; Kryzanowski and Nemiroff, 2001; Choy et al., 2006; Brune and Liu, 
2010), that is, from day T–3 to day T+10. Event windows T–1 to T+1 and T–3 to T+3 
are used for robustness checks.
Abnormal returns (ARit) are measured using the market-adjusted return 
model, which allows one to capture the price effect of a firm’s stock due to changes 
in credit rating (MacKinlay, 1997). Daily log returns (rit) are calculated as follows:
(1)
The expected or normal returns for each entity are estimated using a market 
model. The alpha and beta are calculated using the regression model based on the 
S&P 500 as the comparative market:
(2)
(3)
Next we compute the abnormal returns (ARit) for each company on day t:
The AR are calculated to determine if returns are significantly different from 
expected returns after there is a change in ratings. A standard paired t-test is 
undertaken to determine whether the differences between the abnormal returns 
observed and expected returns are statistically significant.
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To evaluate if investors react more strongly to changes in the credit ratings 
of firms before or after the global crisis period, t-tests are undertaken. Tests are 
run to determine the statistical significance of the difference between abnormal 
returns observed over the event windows and expected returns over the two-
year period before the GFC, and the results are compared with those for the year 
associated with the crisis and six years after the crisis. The results are significant, 
thus suggesting that investors are taking more notice of changes in credit ratings 
after the GFC compared to before it. For robustness checks, the test is run for the 
three different event windows for each period.
IV. RESULTS
Table 3, Panel A, contains results for the differences in means for the credit rating 
upgrades for the different windows. Panel B contains results for the differences in 
means for the credit rating downgrades for the same period and event windows. 
Results corroborate those documented in the literature. The results for 2006 to 
2015 considered over a 14-day window (T-3 to T+10) for the downgrades and 
upgrades are asymmetric. Panel B shows that downgrades in credit ratings lead 
to significant changes in security prices. These results are confirmed when we 
analyse the data for the event windows T-1 to T+1 and T-3 to T+3.
Regardless of the windows considered, the t-values exceed the t-critical 
value, indicating that there are indeed significant changes to returns on securities 
in response to downgrades of credit ratings. The p-values for the three event 
windows for downgrades also confirm that the changes are significant. Because 
the p-value < 0.05 (T-3 to T+10, p = 0.006; T-3 to T+3, p = 0.015; T-1 to T+1, p = 0.004), 
the probability of the changes being due to chance is low, meaning that credit 
rating downgrades significantly affect returns.
The table shows the t-tests for differences in mean for credit ratings. Panel A reports the t-test statistics for the differences in mean 
for the credit rating upgrades for the event windows T-1 to T+1, T-3 to T+3, and T-3 to T+10 for the years 2006 to 2015. Panel B 
reports the t-test statistics for the differences in mean for the credit rating downgrades for the event windows T-1 to T+1, T-3 to T+3, 
and T-3 to T+10 for the years 2006 to 2015. The variance in Panel B is multiplied by 1000.
Panel A
Up-grade in credit rating
Event Window: T-1 
to T+1
Event Window: T-3 
to T*3
Event Window: T-3 
to T+10
Variable 1 Variable 2 Variable 1 Variable 2 Variable 1 Variable 2
Mean -0.0005 0.0013 0.0005 -0.0009 0.0022 -0.0004
Variance 1.86E-05 0.0004 0.0005 0.0012 0.0001 0.0038
Observations 702 702 702 702 702 702
Pearson Correlation 0.5901 -0.085 0.5601
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference
0 0 0
df 701 701 701
t-Stat -2.638 0.8693 1.2188
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0085 0.385 0.2233
t Critical two-tail 1.9634 1.9634 1.9633
Table 3.
 T-Tests for Differences in Mean for Credit Ratings
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Further robustness checks are undertaken by removing outliers, first at the 
1% level (see Table 4, Panel A). These results support those reported in Table 3. 
The results for the test after removing 2% of the outliers are reported in Table 
4, Panel B, and suggest that the null hypothesis is accepted for the longer event 
windows. However, when 1% of the outliers are removed, Panel C column 2 shows 
unexpected results for the event window T-1 to T+1 for credit rating upgrades. 
The t-test results show that changes in credit ratings indeed have a significant 
impact on changes in security prices. The absolute value of t (2.63) is larger than 
the t-critical value (1.96) and the p-value is 0.004, indicating that upgrades have 
a significant impact on the returns of securities. This result suggests significant 
investor reactions immediately after a change in credit rating but that trading 
returns to normal over the next few days and, therefore, the longer event windows 
show no significant abnormal returns. Applying the method of Galai et al. (2008) 
and removing 2% of the outliers, we find no significant impact on security prices 
from upward changes in credit ratings (results not provided but available on 
request).
Table 3.
 T-Tests for Differences in Mean for Credit Ratings (Continued)
Panel B
Down-grade in credit rating
Event Window: T-1 
to T+1 
Event Window: T-3 
to T+3 
Event Window: T-3 
to T+10 
Variable 1 Variable 2 Variable 1 Variable 2 Variable 1 Variable 2
Mean 0.0010 -0.0055 0.0014 -0.0072 0.0040 -0.0113
Variance 0.010 3.54 0.034135 8.8 0.096304 21.8
Observations 657 657 656 656 656 656
Pearson Correlation 0.5043 0.5701 0.6247
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference
0 0 0
df 656 655 655
t-Stat 2.8615 2.4497 2.7659
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0044 0.0146 0.0058
t Critical two-tail 1.9636 1.9636 1.9636
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The table shows the t-tests for credit ratings after removing outliers. Panel A reports the t-test statistics for the credit rating 
downgrade after removing 1% of the outliers for the event windows T-1 to T+1, T-3 to T+3, and T-3 to T+10 for the years 2006 to 
2015. Panel B reports the t-test statistics for the credit rating downgrade after removing 2% of the outliers for the event windows T-1 
to T+1, T-3 to T+3, and T-3 to T+10 for the years 2006 to 2015. Panel C reports the t-test statistics for the credit rating upgrade after 
removing outliers 1% and 2% outliers, respectively for the event window T-1 to T+1 for the years 2006 to 2015.
Panel A
Downgrade in credit rating
(2006 - 2015)
Window: T-1 to T+1
1% of outliers 
removed
Window: T-3 to T+3
1% of outliers 
removed
Window: T-3 to T+10
1% of outliers 
removed
Observations 650 649 649
t-Stat 4.0554 2.4516 2.0145
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0001 0.0145 0.0444
t Critical two-tail 1.9636 1.9636 1.9636
Panel B
Downgrade in credit rating
(2006 - 2015)
Window: T-1 to 
T+1
2% of outliers 
removed
Window: T-3 to 
T+3
2% of outliers 
removed
Window: T-3 to 
T+10
2% of outliers 
removed
Observations 644 643 643
t-Stat 4.0016 1.9079 1.5099
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0001 0.0569 0.1316
t Critical two-tail 1.9637 1.9637 1.9637
Panel C
Upgrade in credit rating
(2006 - 2015)
Window: T-1 to 
T+1
Window: T-1 to 
T+1
1% of outliers 
removed
Window: T-1 to 
T+1
2% of outliers 
removed
Observations 695 695 688
t-Stat -2.6381 -1.9997 -1.1129
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0085 0.0459 0.2661
T Critical two-tail 1.9634 1.9634 1.96342
Table 4.
T-Tests for Credit Ratings Without Outliers
The results of statistical tests for the sample that includes data for the two years 
preceding the global credit crisis are in Table 5. Upgrades of credit ratings over the 
longer event windows (T-3 to T+3 and T-3 to T+10) have no significant impact on 
security prices compared to the short three-day event window (T-1 to T+1), thus 
rejecting the null hypothesis. However, the exact opposite results are observed for 
the impact of downgrades of credit ratings on security prices. Downward changes 
in credit ratings significantly impact returns for the two longer event windows. 
This is consistent with the results of prior studies. However, tests of the impact of 
downgrades over the event window of three days (T-1 to T+1) for the 2006–2007 
period yields conflicting results compared to those for the whole data set. The 
t-values in this case are smaller than the t-critical value, suggesting that changes in 
credit ratings do not lead to significant abnormal returns on securities.
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The table shows t-tests for credit ratings without 1% and 2% outliers. Panel A reports the t-test statistics for the credit rating 
upgrades after removing 1% and 2% outliers for the period 2006 to 2007. Panel B reports the t-test statistics for the credit rating 
downgrades after removing 1% and 2% outliers for the period 2006 to 2007.
Panel A
Upgrade 
in credit rating
Window: T-1 to T+1 Window: T-3 to T+3 Window: T-3 to T+10
Outliers Removed None 1% 2% None 1% 2% None 1% 2%
Observations 172 170 169 172 170 169 172 170 169
t-Stat -5.0501 -5.1188 -5.1001 -0.7721 0.2114 0.4233 0.3168 1.1331 1.0688
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4411 0.8328 0.6726 0.7517 0.2588 0.2867
t Critical two-tail 1.9739 1.9741 1.9742 1.9739 1.9741 1.9742 1.9739 1.9741 1.9742
Panel B
Downgrade
in credit rating
Window: T-1 to T+1 Window: T-3 to T+3 Window: T-3 to T+10
Outliers Removed None 1% 2% None 1% 2% None 1% 2%
Observations 128 127 125 127 126 124 127 126 124
t-Stat 0.8466 1.7664 1.4947 1.9922 1.6232 3.1331 2.5604 2.3325 2.4495
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.3988 0.0798 0.1375 0.0485 0.1071 0.0022 0.7517 0.0213 0.0157
t Critical two-tail 1.9788 1.9790 1.9793 1.9790 1.9791 1.9794 1.9790 1.9791 1.9794
The table shows t-tests for credit ratings without 1% and 2% outliers for 2008. Panel A reports the t-test statistics for the credit rating 
upgrades after removing 1% and 2% outliers for the year 2008. Panel B reports the t-test statistics for the credit rating downgrades 
after removing 1% and 2% outliers for the year 2008.
Panel A
Upgrade 
in credit rating
Window: T-1 to T+1 Window: T-3 to T+3 Window: T-3 to T+10
Outliers Removed None 1% 2% None 1% 2% None 1% 2%
Observations 60 59 59 60 59 59 60 59 59
t-Stat 2.4346 2.3745 2.3745 0.0172 -0.1787 -0.1787 -1.674 -0.7348 -0.7348
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0180 0.0209 0.0209 0.9863 0.8588 0.8588 0.099 0.4654 0.4654
t Critical two-tail 2.0001 2.0017 2.0017 2.0001 2.0017 2.0017 2.000 2.0017 2.0017
Table 5.
T-Tests for Credit Ratings Without 1% and 2% Outliers for 2006 to 2007
Table 6.
T-Tests for Credit Ratings Without 1% and 2% Outliers for 2008
The GFC-2008 results are reported in Table 6. The results suggest that investors 
did not react strongly then to changes in credit ratings. The results in Table 6 show 
that the only event window that rejects the null hypothesis is that from T-1 to T+1 for 
credit rating upgrades. Over the three-day event window for 2008, the t-values are 
larger than the t-critical value in tests of the relationship between changes in stock 
prices and changes in credit ratings. Further robustness checks are undertaken for 
this window after the outliers at the 1% and 2% levels are removed. The results 
confirm those for the full-sample data tested for this event window.
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Results for the six-year period following the GFC occupy Table 7. The ratings 
upgrades of firms’ securities over this period significantly influence daily returns 
for the 14-day event window from T-3 to T+10. The t-values exceed t-critical values 
(p-value = 0.005), suggesting that the null hypothesis of no significant changes to 
returns due to changes in credit ratings is rejected. This is contrary to the findings 
for the other periods tested in this study and of the earlier research reviewed. 
Robustness checks with outliers removed yield similar results, thus rejecting 
the null hypothesis. Tests for statistical significance over the two shorter event 
windows of three days (T-1 to T+1) and seven days (T-3 to T+3) yield similar 
results, that is, there is no significant market reaction to upgrades of credit ratings.
The results for credit rating downgrades suggest that the securities market 
does react significantly to them. All three event windows tested show high t-values 
compared to their respective t-critical values. Further robustness checks with 1% 
of the outliers removed confirm these results. However, when 2% of the outliers 
are removed over the event windows T-3 to T+3 and T-3 to T+10, the results show 
that changes in credit ratings have no effect on returns.
Table 6.
T-Tests for Credit Ratings Without 1% and 2% Outliers for 2008 (Continued)
Panel B
Downgrade
in credit rating
Window: T-1 to T+1 Window: T-3 to T+3 Window: T-3 to T+10
Outliers Removed None 1% 2% None 1% 2% None 1% 2%
Observations 120 119 118 120 119 118 120 119 118
t-Stat 0.3654 1.0764 0.8055 0.0063 0.3599 -0.0713 0.3418 -0.1790 -0.4460
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.7154 0.2840 0.4221 0.9950 0.7196 0.9432 0.7331 0.8583 0.6564
t Critical two-tail 1.9801 1.9803 1.9804 1.9801 1.9803 1.9804 1.9801 1.9803 1.9804
The table shows t-tests for credit ratings without 1% and 2% outliers for 2009 to 2015. Panel A reports the t-test statistics for the 
credit rating upgrades after removing 1% and 2% outliers for the period 2009 to 2015. Panel B reports the t-test statistics for the 
credit rating downgrades after removing 1% and 2% outliers for the period 2009 to 2015.
Panel A
Upgrade 
in credit rating
Window: T-1 to T+1 Window: T-3 to T+3 Window: T-3 to T+10
Outliers Removed None 1% 2% None 1% 2% None 1% 2%
Observations 470 465 461 470 465 461 470 465 461
t-Stat -1.2650 -0.6901 -0.2500 -0.8431 1.4269 1.4095 2.8167 4.5490 4.8557
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.2065 0.4905 0.8027 0.3996 0.1543 0.1594 0.0051 0.0000 0.0000
t Critical two-tail 1.9650 1.9651 1.9651 1.9650 1.9651 1.9651 1.9650 1.9651 1.9651
Table 7.
T-Tests for Credit Ratings Without 1% and 2% Outliers for 2009 to 2015
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The impact ratings changes on returns by different credit rating agencies Fitch, 
Moody’s, and S&P are reported in Tables 8 to 10. For the primary event window 
of 14 days, the results over the full sample (2006–2015) show no significant impact 
on firm share prices due to upward changes in credit ratings by S&P or Moody’s. 
However, when Fitch adjusts a credit rating upwards, the market reacts strongly, 
with a t-value of 4.78, which is significantly higher than the t-critical value of 1.97. 
However, robustness checks over the shorter event windows fail to confirm these 
findings, implying that the market reacts this strongly only four days or more after 
the rating change announcement.
Results from announcements of downward changes in credit ratings indicate 
that the market only reacts strongly to changes announced by Moody’s. Over the 
14-day event window (T-3 to T+10), the t-values are much larger than the t-critical 
value, showing that the abnormal returns observed are due to the events occurring, 
that is, changes in credit ratings. These results are confirmed for Moody’s with 
robustness checks over the shorter event windows T-1 to T+1 and T-3 to T+10. 
The results of downward changes for the other two rating agencies reveal that 
announcements have no significant impact on security prices. These results are 
consistent over all three event windows.
Analysis of the rating changes by the individual rating agencies shows very 
little significant impact on the prices of securities before the global credit crisis. 
For all three agencies in this study, neither an upward nor a downward change in 
credit ratings has an abnormal impact over the primary event window of 14 days. 
The robustness check for the three-day period reveals that upward rating changes 
by S&P and Fitch have a significant impact on share prices. The inconsistency in 
the longer event window is also observed for downward changes by S&P and 
Moody’s over the mid-range window T-3 to T+3. It is, however, important to note 
that the number of observations over this period is relatively small, especially 
observations recorded for Moody’s, with only 15 upgrades and 18 downgrades. 
To achieve a more reliable result, it is recommended that the sample be extended 
to a few years earlier.
The comparative analysis of the impact of ratings announcement by the 
separate rating agencies reveals that the market is reacting more strongly to 
changes since the global credit crisis than before it. Investors relying on rating 
announcements by Fitch reacted the most to any changes. The results indicate that 
Table 7.
T-Tests for Credit Ratings Without 1% and 2% Outliers for 2009 to 2015 
(Continued)
Panel B
Downgrade
in credit rating
Window: T-1 to T+1 Window: T-3 to T+3 Window: T-3 to T+10
Outliers Removed None 1% 2% None 1% 2% None 1% 2%
Observations 409 405 401 409 405 401 409 405 401
t-Stat 3.9592 3.7198 3.4993 2.9708 2.1730 1.8263 2.8167 2.0867 1.6431
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 0.0031 0.0304 0.0685 0.0048 0.0375 0.1012
t Critical two-tail 1.9658 1.9658 1.9659 1.9658 1.9659 1.9659 1.9658 1.9659 1.9659
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an announcement of an upward change by Fitch over all three event windows 
significantly impacted abnormal returns of security prices. Announcements of 
downward changes by Fitch also produced significant results over the two shorter 
event windows.
Results from announcements made by Moody’s indicate that followers of their 
rating changes only reacted significantly to downward changes. These results are 
consistent with earlier research that concludes that entities tend to release positive 
information sooner and thus upward credit rating changes do not come as a 
surprise to investors (Chen et al., 2001; Bae et al., 2006; Alsakka and Gwilym, 2012).
Rating announcements by S&P do not appear to signal new information to the 
market, since the results show that the only significant impact on security prices 
is observed in reaction to upward rating changes over the short three-day event 
window that is used as a robustness check.
The table shows t-tests for credit ratings reported by S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s for the period 2006 to 2015. Panel A reports the t-test 
statistics for the credit rating upgrades reported by S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s for the period 2006 to 2015. Panel B reports the t-test 
statistics for the credit rating downgrades reported by S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s for the period 2006 to 2015.
Panel A
Upgrade 
in credit rating
Window: T-1 to T+1 Window: T-3 to T+3 Window: T-3 to T+10
Outliers 
Removed*
S&P Fitch Moody’s S&P Fitch Moody’s S&P Fitch Moody’s
Observations 441 199 62 441 199 62 441 199 62
t-Stat -3.1869 1.2235 -1.5342 -1.3068 1.8126 -1.2468 -0.8807 4.7847 1.6750
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0015 0.2226 0.1310 0.1920 0.0714 0.2172 0.3790 0.0000 0.0991
t Critical two-tail 1.9654 1.9720 1.9996 1.9654 1.9720 1.9996 1.9654 1.9720 1.9996
Panel B
Downgrade
in credit rating
Window: T-1 to T+1 Window: T-3 to T+3 Window: T-3 to T+10
Outliers Removed S&P Fitch Moody’s S&P Fitch Moody’s S&P Fitch Moody’s
Observations 363 187 107 363 186 107 363 186 107
t-Stat 1.7954 0.3007 3.5149 1.3410 -0.7536 3.8335 0.8361 0.1014 3.9794
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0734 0.7639 0.0006 0.1808 0.4520 0.0002 0.4036 0.9193 0.0001
t Critical two-tail 1.9665 1.9728 1.9826 1.9665 1.9729 1.9826 1.9665 1.9729 1.9826
Table 8.
T-Tests for Credit Ratings Reported by S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s
for the Period 2006 to 2015
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 21, Number 3, January 2019358
The table shows t-tests for credit ratings reported by S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s for the period 2006 to 2007. Panel A reports the t-test 
statistics for the credit rating upgrades reported by S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s for the period 2006 to 2007. Panel B reports the t-test 
statistics for the credit rating downgrades reported by S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s for the period 2006 to 2007.
Panel A
Upgrade 
in credit rating
Window: T-1 to T+1 Window: T-3 to T+3 Window: T-3 to T+10
Outliers 
Removed*
S&P Fitch Moody’s S&P Fitch Moody’s S&P Fitch Moody’s
Observations 95 62 15 95 62 15 95 62 15
t-Stat -4.4919 -2.1226 -1.6471 -1.0665 0.1307 1.2994 -0.1348 -0.4265 1.9516
P(T<=t) two-tail -0.0000 0.0379 0.1218 0.2889 0.8964 0.2148 0.8931 0.6314 0.0713
t Critical two-tail 1.9855 1.9996 2.1448 1.9855 1.9996 2.1448 1.9855 1.9996 2.1448
Panel B
Downgrade
in credit rating
Window: T-1 to T+1 Window: T-3 to T+3 Window: T-3 to T+10
Outliers Removed S&P Fitch Moody’s S&P Fitch Moody’s S&P Fitch Moody’s
Observations 72 38 18 72 37 18 72 37 18
t-Stat 1.1633 -1.1564 1.1286 2.1679 -1.8365 2.1910 1.9297 1.0217 1.3210
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.2486 0.2455 0.2748 0.3352 0.0746 0.0426 0.0576 0.3137 0.2040
t Critical two-tail 1.9939 2.0262 2.1098 1.9939 2.0281 2.1098 1.9939 2.0281 2.1098
The table shows t-tests for credit ratings reported by S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s for the period 2009 to 2015. Panel A reports the t-test 
statistics for the credit rating upgrades reported by S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s for the period 2009 to 2015. Panel B reports the t-test 
statistics for the credit rating downgrades reported by S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s for the period 2009 to 2015.
Panel A
Upgrade 
in credit rating
Window: T-1 to T+1 Window: T-3 to T+3 Window: T-3 to T+10
Outliers 
Removed*
S&P Fitch Moody’s S&P Fitch Moody’s S&P Fitch Moody’s
Observations 302 124 44 302 124 44 302 124 44
t-Stat -2.4223 2.8192 -1.4087 -1.0713 2.2025 -1.2381 0.3253 7.2004 0.7509
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0160 0.00561 0.1661 0.2849 0.0295 0.2224 0.7452 5.224E-11 0.4568
t Critical two-tail 1.9679 1.97943 2.0167 1.9679 1.9794 2.0167 1.9679 1.9794 2.0167
Panel B
Downgrade
in credit rating
Window: T-1 to T+1 Window: T-3 to T+3 Window: T-3 to T+10
Outliers 
Removed*
S&P Fitch Moody’s S&P Fitch Moody’s S&P Fitch Moody’s
Observations 223 114 72 223 114 72 223 114 72
t-Stat -0.0350 4.5043 3.8775 0.2657 2.7443 3.4141 0.5352 1.0353 3.3398
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.9721 0.0000 0.0002 0.7908 0.0071 0.0011 0.5931 0.3027 0.0013
t Critical two-tail 1.9707 1.9812 1.9939 1.9707 1.9812 1.9939 1.9707 1.9812 1.9939
Table 9.
T-Tests for Credit Ratings Reported by S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s
for the Period 2006 to 2007
Table 10.
T-Tests for Credit Ratings Reported by S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s
for the Period 2009 to 2015
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The effect of a change in credit rating over different classes or within a class 
are summarized in Tables 11 to 13. Evaluation of the data over the entire period 
(2006–2015) yields mixed results. Announcements of upgrades in credit ratings 
have significant impacts on abnormal returns when the rating grade moves up 
within the investment-grade category, as well as for upward movements from 
speculative- to investment-grade ratings. The results for the full data set tested 
for downgrades show that rating changes have a significant impact only for 
downgrades within the investment-grade class. These findings are in contrast to 
those of previous studies which conclude that announcements downgrades of 
credit ratings over classes have a significant impact on security prices, with no 
significant impact observed for upgrades (Choy et al., 2006; Halek and Eckles, 
2010; Freitas and Minardi, 2013).
Breaking the evaluation of rating changes up over the two periods surrounding 
the GFC yields the following results. For the period 2006 to 2007, the results indicate 
that an announcement of a change in ratings (upwards or downwards) has no 
effect on returns. There is one exception, however, which is for upgrades of credit 
ratings within the investment-grade class over the short-term event window of 
three days. These results match those for the full data set but once again contradict 
the evidence of earlier studies.
Regarding the results during the period after the global credit crisis, we 
find evidence that suggests the market is now taking greater note of changes 
in credit ratings. Our findings indicate that an announcement of a credit rating 
upgrade where the rating moves from speculative grade to investment grade has 
a significant impact on security prices. The results suggest this for all three event 
windows tested. However, when evaluating the announcements of downgrades 
for the period after the global credit crisis, we find the results show a significant 
impact only when a downgrade is announced for movements within investment-
grade ratings.
The table shows t-tests for between and within different credit ratings for the period 2006 to 2015. Panel A reports the t-test statistics 
for the credit rating upgrades between and within different grading classes for the period 2006 to 2015. Panel B reports the t-test 
statistics for the credit rating downgrades between and within different grading classes for the period 2006 to 2015.
Panel A
Upgrade 
in credit rating
Upgrade within 
Investment grade
Upgrade from 
Speculative to 
Investment grade 
quality
Upgrade within 
Speculative grade
Outliers 
Removed*
T-1 to 
T+1
T-3 to
T+3
T-3 to
T+10
T-1 to 
T+1
T-3 to
T+3
T-3 to 
T+10
T-1 to 
T+1
T-3 to
T+3
T-3 to 
T+10
Observations 449 449 449 85 85 85 168 168 168
t-Stat -4.6622 -2.0186 0.4958 1.9813 2.3275 3.2286 -1.0993 -1.4234 -0.6842
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0000 0.0441 0.6203 0.0508 0.0223 0.0018 0.2732 0.1565 0.4948
t Critical two-tail 1.9653 1.9653 1.9653 1.9886 1.9886 1.9886 1.9743 1.9743 1.9743
Table 11.
 T-Tests for Between and Within Different Credit Ratings
for the Period 2006 to 2015
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Table 11.
 T-Tests for Between and Within Different Credit Ratings
for the Period 2006 to 2015 (Continued)
Panel B
Downgrade
in credit rating
Downgrade within 
Investment grade
Downgrade from 
Investment to 
Speculative grade 
quality
Downgrade within 
Speculative grade
Outliers 
Removed*
T-1 to 
T+1
T-3 to
T+3
T-3 to
T+10
T-1 to 
T+1
T-3 to
T+3
T-3 to 
T+10
T-1 to 
T+1
T-3 to
T+3
T-3 to 
T+10
Observations 512 511 511 49 49 49 96 96 96
t-Stat 3.1989 3.2059 3.5014 0.5106 0.7492 0.5684 2.0175 1.3656 1.5709
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0015 0.0014 0.0005 0.6120 0.4574 0.5714 0.0465 0.1753 0.1195
t Critical two-tail 1.9646 1.9646 1.9646 2.0106 2.0106 2.0106 1.9853 1.9853 1.9853
The table shows t-tests for between and within different credit ratings for the period 2006 to 2007. Panel A reports the t-test statistics 
for the credit rating upgrades between and within different grading classes for the period 2006 to 2007. Panel B reports the t-test 
statistics for the credit rating downgrades between and within different grading classes for the period 2006 to 2007.
Panel A
Upgrade 
in credit rating
Upgrade within 
Investment grade
Upgrade from 
Speculative to 
Investment grade 
quality
Upgrade within 
Speculative grade
Outliers 
Removed*
T-1 to 
T+1
T-3 to
T+3
T-3 to
T+10
T-1 to 
T+1
T-3 to
T+3
T-3 to 
T+10
T-1 to 
T+1
T-3 to
T+3
T-3 to 
T+10
Observations 120 120 120 14 14 14 38 38 38
t-Stat -3.5181 -0.5605 0.3042 -0.4123 -0.0397 1.7238 -0.7764 -0.6660 -0.6642
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0006 0.5762 0.7615 0.6869 0.9690 0.1084 0.4425 0.5096 0.5107
t Critical two-tail 1.9801 1.9801 1.9801 2.1604 2.1604 2.1604 2.0265 2.0262 2.0262
Panel B
Downgrade
in credit rating
Downgrade within 
Investment grade
Downgrade from 
Investment to 
Speculative grade 
quality
Downgrade within 
Speculative grade
Outliers 
Removed*
T-1 to 
T+1
T-3 to
T+3
T-3 to
T+10
T-1 to 
T+1
T-3 to
T+3
T-3 to 
T+10
T-1 to 
T+1
T-3 to
T+3
T-3 to 
T+10
Observations 91 90 90 13 13 13 23 23 23
t-Stat -0.5557 0.0509 1.0830 -1.1412 -0.3687 0.3164 0.4200 0.5559 0.5441
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.5798 0.9596 0.2817 0.2744 0.7183 0.7567 0.6785 0.5839 0.5919
t Critical two-tail 1.9867 1.9870 1.9870 2.1604 2.1604 2.1604 2.0739 2.0739 2.0739
Table 12.
T-Tests for Between and Within Different Credit Ratings for the Period 2006 to 2007
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V. CONCLUSION
This study examines how credit rating changes, both upgrades and downgrades, 
influence returns of firms issuing securities. We examine the impact of credit rating 
changes on 449 of the S&P 500 firms for which 10-year daily data are available 
from 2006 to 2015. Among these 449 companies, 1,359 credit rating changes were 
announced (702 upwards and 657 downwards). The sample is partitioned into 
three subperiods to analyse how ratings changes influence returns of an issuing 
firm’s securities before, during, and after the GFC.
We find mixed results for the whole sample. A credit rating downgrade leads to 
a significant market reaction whereas an upward change has no effect on returns—
findings that corroborate Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and Brooks (2015), who report 
that rating downgrades do have a significant impact in the Australian and Japanese 
markets, although this is not the case for rating upgrade announcements. The lack 
of effect of upgrades is consistent with the idea that firms release favourable or 
optimistic information faster and, therefore, an upward change in ratings does not 
deliver fresh information to the investor.
An analysis of the three subperiods before, during, and after the global credit 
crisis also delivers mixed results. The results for the two years preceding the GFC 
are mostly consistent with those for the whole sample, apart for the robustness 
The table shows t-tests for between and within different credit ratings for the period 2009 to 2015. Panel A reports the t-test statistics 
for the credit rating upgrades between and within different grading classes for the period 2009 to 2015. Panel B reports the t-test 
statistics for the credit rating downgrades between and within different grading classes for the period 2009 to 2015.
Panel A
Upgrade 
in credit rating
Upgrade within 
Investment grade
Upgrade from 
Speculative to 
Investment grade 
quality
Upgrade within 
Speculative grade
Outliers 
Removed*
T-1 to 
T+1
T-3 to
T+3
T-3 to
T+10
T-1 to 
T+1
T-3 to
T+3
T-3 to 
T+10
T-1 to 
T+1
T-3 to
T+3
T-3 to 
T+10
Observations 297 297 297 63 63 63 110 110 110
t-Stat -2.5623 -0.8086 2.0654 2.7151 2.7377 4.0844 -1.8109 -1.4866 -0.1731
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0109 0.4194 0.0398 0.0086 0.0081 0.0001 0.0729 0.1400 0.8629
t Critical two-tail 1.9680 1.9680 1.9680 1.9990 1.9990 1.9990 1.9820 1.9820 1.9820
Panel B
Downgrade
in credit rating
Downgrade within 
Investment grade
Downgrade from 
Investment to 
Speculative grade 
quality
Downgrade within 
Speculative grade
Outliers 
Removed*
T-1 to 
T+1
T-3 to
T+3
T-3 to
T+10
T-1 to 
T+1
T-3 to
T+3
T-3 to 
T+10
T-1 to 
T+1
T-3 to
T+3
T-3 to 
T+10
Observations 340 340 340 24 24 24 45 45 45
t-Stat 4.5229 4.4778 4.4937 0.8895 1.1219 0.7734 2.6092 1.2244 -0.4111
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3830 0.2735 0.4472 0.0154 0.2273 0.6830
t Critical two-tail 1.9670 1.9670 1.9670 2.0687 2.0687 2.0687 2.0154 2.0154 2.0154
Table 13.
T-Tests for Between and Within Different Credit Ratings for the Period 2009 to 2015
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check over the three-day event window (T-1 to T+1). These inconsistencies are 
observed for both upward and downward changes in credit ratings.
For the period after the global credit crisis, we find that downward changes 
in credit ratings produce significant changes in security prices, similar to earlier 
studies and to the tests for the whole sample. Since the findings for the event 
window T-3 to T+10 vary from those of earlier studies or for the period before the 
GFC in this study, this suggests investors take up to 10 days to react to an upward 
change in credit rating.
Comparison of the results from the period before the global credit crisis (2006–
2007) to the period after it (2009–2015) suggests that the market is more sensitive 
to the announcements of changes in credit ratings by specific rating agencies. 
Announcements of upward or downward changes in credit ratings by Fitch have 
a significant impact on security prices for all the event windows tested, apart from 
the 14-day downgrade window after the global credit crisis. This result indicates 
that the market considers Fitch’s changes in credit rating important information 
on which to base investment decisions. And, announcements of downward rating 
changes by Moody’s, as opposed to upward changes, have a significant impact on 
security prises. This would suggest that users relying on Moody’s credit ratings by 
now view the downward announcement as new and important information and 
react accordingly.
The impact of announcements of credit rating changes over classes of ratings 
suggests that the market reacts strongly to upward changes in credit rating from 
speculative grade to investment grade, as evidenced over all three event windows 
tested. However, a significant impact is observed for downward rating changes 
within the investment-grade category, which is more in line with the results of 
previous studies.
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